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Public interest fosters debate in many disciplines, including corporate
governance discourses about corporations at the point when what is optimal
for society or the greatest good for society is considered. Nevertheless,
public interest is rarely given a prominent role in corporate law; this has
partly been because there is no definitive objective definition for the notion.
Therefore there are contentions that public interest ought to be jettisoned or
that it is not fit for purpose. This article examines if a definitive objective
definition of the public interest is required in order for it to be fit for purpose,
that is, to serve societal interests. Using a deconstruction approach, various
theories on the public interest will be discussed as well as corporate theories
to explore how they encapsulate various conceptions of the public interest.
This article then argues that corporate theories incorporate tacitly or
otherwise, the public interest, and that this is desirable because it could
provide alternative ways of addressing corporate governance concerns. It is
also added that an objective definition of the public interest is not imperative
in order for the notion to be useful, rather a dynamic and flexible definition of
the public interest enables corporations to be responsive and responsible for
their societal impact, particularly in this era of rapid globalisation.
I Introduction
Public interest has been an important concept particularly in political and
philosophical discourses for hundreds of years. It has a venerable history and
tradition, from Aristotle’s common good rationale for good governance and
the purpose of a society to Wiredu’s transcending notions of common good.1
Public interest is however not limited to political thought; it is a salient
concept which has been transposed and appropriated by various disciplines
including the regulation of the professions, commercial and business spheres,
international or global governance.2 This is because public interest has
* PhD Candidate, Centre for Business Law and Practice, School of Law, University of Leeds,
UK.
1 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest: Counterbalancing Economic
Individualism (Georgetown University Press, 2007) 1; Aristotle, The Politics, Book I (TA
Sinclair trans, Penguin, revised ed, 2000) [trans of: Politics (first published 350 BCE)]; John
Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Chapter II: Of the State of Nature (London, 1823);
Kwasi Wiredu, ‘Introduction: African Philosophy in Our Time’ in Kwasi Wiredu (ed), A
Companion to African Philosophy (Blackwell Publishing, 2004).
2 Kadri Simm, ‘The Concept of Common Good and Public Interest: From Plato to
1
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connotations of values which are thought to be in the societal interest and
contributory to the common good as well as the amelioration of societal
welfare.3 It is not surprising then that public interest or societal interest is
increasingly becoming a critical issue of contention in corporate governance
literature. However, its definitions are scant and little explanation is given as
to why public interest is or is not paramount for corporate governance or
normative corporate law. Nevertheless, public interest is mentioned albeit
grudgingly by some, in discourses about corporations at the point when what
is optimal for society or the greatest good for society is considered.4
Therefore, although public interest is rarely given a prominent role in
corporate law, it is generally accepted in varying degrees that corporations and
corporate law should serve societal interests or general societal welfare in
some manner.5 Public interest is a useful consideration in corporate discourses
because it could provide another way of addressing and examining corporate
misconduct which can have devastating societal impact.6 Activities of
regulators on all levels of corporate governance have been mostly
‘scandal-driven’.7 Yet the globalised nature of commerce has meant that the
activities of corporations have far-reaching consequences and are of societal
concern.8 Public interest could provide a feasible alternative to a knee-jerk
scandal-driven reaction to corporate law and governance.
Being that public interest is generally used to describe common interests,
values or characteristics desired by individuals such as the protection of
liberty, private property rights as well as other values such as social or moral
values,9 explicitly acknowledging public interest in corporate law discourses
can foster better understanding of the societal role of corporations. It also can
Biobanking’ (2011) 20 Cambridge Quarterly Healthcare Ethics 554; Alan Demack, ‘Public
Interest or Common Good of the Community: Bringing Order to a Dog’s Breakfast’ (2015)
6 Legal Ethics 23; Bruce Douglass, ‘The Common Good and the Public Interest’ (1980) 8
Political Theory 103; Surendra Arjoon, Alvaro Turriago-Hoyos and Ulf Thoene,
‘Virtuousness and the Common Good as a Conceptual Framework for Harmonizing the
Goals of the Individual, Organizations, and the Economy’ (2018) 147 Journal of Business
Ethics 143.
3 J Robert Branston, Keith Cowling and Roger Sugden, ‘Corporate Governance and the Public
Interest’ (2006) 20 International Review of Applied Economics 189; Joseph E Stiglitz,
‘Global Public Goods and Global Finance: Does Global Governance Ensure that the Global
Public Interest is Served?’ in Jean-Philippe Touffut (ed), Advancing Public Goods (Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2006) 149; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
OECD Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity (2017)
<http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/recommendation-public-integrity/.
4 Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
(Harvard University Press, 4th ed, 1991) 4, 6–7.
5 Ibid.
6 Rupert Neate, ‘Ratings agencies suffer “conflict of interest”, says former Moody’s boss’,
The Guardian (online), 22 August 2011
<http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/aug/22/ratings-agencies-conflict-of-interest.
7 Allison Fass, ‘One Year Later, The Impact Of Sarbanes-Oxley’, Forbes (online),
22 July 2003 <http://www.forbes.com/2003/07/22/cz_af_0722sarbanes.html; the slew of
corporate scandals, including Enron, Arthur Andersen, Tyco, Global Crossing and
WorldCom which led to the enactment of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
8 BBC News, ‘Carillion collapse to cost taxpayers £148m’, 7 June 2018
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-44383224.
9 Stephen M King, Bradley S Chilton and Gay E Roberts, ‘Reflections on Defining the Public
Interest’ (2010) 41 Administration and Society 954, 957.
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create a bridge between the various corporate theories of the firm in order to
enhance and foster good corporate governance.10
However, defining the public interest has proven to be a challenge shrouded
in mystery. It has been and still is the subject of numerous debates as theorists
seek a singular or objective all-encompassing definition. Although, it is
imperative that public interest is defined in order to explore how it may foster
good corporate governance, an important issue is the demystification of the
notion, defining it in a manner that embraces its heterogeneous realities, and
identifying and evaluating its varied definitions. This would enable a complex
and nuanced understanding of fast-changing societal needs and interests and
the role corporations play in the (dis)satisfaction of societal interests. In order
to demystify the notion of the pubic interest, Derrida’s theory on
deconstructivism11 will be used as a guiding tool to conduct an enquiry into
the concept.12 Accordingly, deconstructionism will be used to identify and
explore various existing definitions of public interest in the different
categories of corporate theories and interrogate the relationship between
public interest and corporate theories.13 It is then contended first that there is
no absolute static definition of public interest but that it is a dynamic concept
which requires continuous consideration and questioning of the accepted basis
of its meaning. This is a way of ensuring that public interest is not rigid but
continues to serve as an analytical lens for meeting societal needs in numerous
spheres including corporations. The deconstructionist approach thus
contributes to re-centring public interest at the heart of discourses about the
common good, good governance and interests of general benefit to society.
This extends to good governance of corporations and realigning corporations
with societal interests.
This article is structured as follows. First, there is a brief discussion about
deconstructionism, exploration of three public interest theories and
definitions. Second, there is a general consideration of broad categories of
corporate theories of the firm. Third, and this is the main part of the article,
there is an assessment or exploration of public interest, its various conceptions
and illustrations of how they are implicitly or explicitly present in the
development and rationales for corporate theories. Lastly, there are some
concluding remarks.
10 For definition of corporate governance, see Marc Moore, Corporate Governance in the
Shadow of the State (Hart Publishing, 2013) 14; Marc Moore and Martin Petrin, Corporate
Governance: Law, Regulation and Theory (Palgrave, 2017) 3.
11 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans, Johns Hopkins
University Press, corrected ed, 1998) [trans of: De la grammatologie (first published 1967)];
Jacques Derrida, ‘The Future of the Profession or the Unconditional University (Thanks to
the “Humanities,” What Could Take Place Tomorrow)’ in Peter Pericles Trifonas and
Michael A Peters (eds), Deconstructing Derrida: Tasks for the New Humanities
(Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005) 26.
12 Jacques Derrida, Force de loi: Le ‘Fondement mystique de l’autorité’ (Galilée, 2005) 22–24,
26.
13 Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books, 1970) chs 3–5.
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II Deconstructionism: An interrogation into the public
interest
II.I Deconstructionism: The method of analysis
Derrida’s Of Grammatology was where deconstructionism was first
delineated. It was applied to explore the language and construction or
adaptation of Heidegger’s Destruction.14 Derrida explicated deconstruction as
a notion that pays attention to structure but goes beyond structuralism. It is
added that deconstruction focuses on the undoing, decomposing and
extricating of structures, notions or institutions rather than their destruction, or
even simple analysis or critique.15 It is consequently difficult to define
deconstruction as its predicates, defining concepts and significations can
themselves be subject to deconstruction.16 In Derrida’s Force de loi: Le
‘Fondement mystique de l’autorité’, justice and the history of right were used
to illustrate and explicate deconstruction.17 It was argued that one cannot
speak directly of justice or objectivise justice without betraying its essence
and thus limiting it.18 In a similar manner, one cannot speak objectively of
public interest without limiting it.19 This requires the questioning of the origin
and theories of the public interest so as to undertake a rigorous deconstruction
without neutralising the concept itself.20 Essentially, a deconstructionist
approach to defining and understanding public interest problematises
perceptions of singularity.21 Deconstructionism is thus a useful method to
defining public interest because there is no preferred peculiar, singular or even
uniquely deconstructionist view; it is instead marked by nuances, reflexivity
and self-awareness which are important to defining public interest in a manner
that serves societal interests including the examination of the role of
corporations.22
Similarly, deconstruction enables a discussion of the public interest in a
manner that exceeds a hierarchy of binary oppositions and allows for the
existence of undecidable notions.23 This means that public interest is accepted
as an undecidable notion, complex and undefinable but not problematised. In
this manner, public interest can transcend disciplinary and ideological bias,
scholarly or academic trends because it is not limited to a particular or specific
conceptualisation. It is instead flexible and open to continuous evolution
which means that it can serve societal interests in innumerable manners from
the regulation of personal data to ensuring corporate responsibility.
14 Derrida, Of Grammatology, above n 11; Jacques Derrida, ‘Letter to a Japanese Friend’ in
David Wood and Robert Bernasconi (eds), Derrida and Différance (Parousia Press, 1985) 1,
2.
15 Derrida, ‘Letter to a Japanese Friend’, above n 14, 1, 4.
16 Ibid.
17 Derrida, Force de loi: Le ‘Fondement mystique de l’autorité’, above n 12.
18 Ibid 26.
19 Ibid 34–5.
20 Ibid 45.
21 Stefan Herbrechter and Ivan Callus, ‘The Grammar of Deconstruction’ in Simon Morgan
Wortham and Allison Weiner (eds), Encountering Derrida: Legacies and Futures of
Deconstruction (Continuum, 2007) 138.
22 Ibid; Jacques Derrida, Positions (University of Chicago Press, 1981) 39–44.
23 Derrida, Positions, above n 22, 43.
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Attention will now turn to a brief overview of public interest theories. These
will, in a latter part of the article, be examined and critiqued through
deconstructionist lens.
II.II Overview of public interest theories
Although there is a plethora of public interest theories, for the purpose of this
article, Virginia Held’s categories — preponderance or aggregative theories,
unitary theories and common interest theories — will be explored because
they highlight various ways of critiquing and defining public interest in a
manner that is accessible to deconstructionist methodological
considerations.24
1 Preponderance or aggregative theories
Preponderance or aggregative theories25 are based on a subjective and
individualist conception of public interest. Hence public interest is generally
seen as synonymous with the interest of preponderance or aggregate sum of
individuals.26 Public interest is based on self-regarding interests common to
the preponderance of individuals in the community27 or regarded as
aggregation or sum of individual interests or preferences.28 These theories
tend to be associated with economic interests, increase in the general
economic welfare of society with a focus on individual liberty and the
satisfaction of individuals’ wants and needs through the creation of optimum
environment, often synonymous with a liberal government or state. This
usually implies limited governmental intervention in individuals’ affairs but
governmental instrumentation in securing the satisfaction of individual wants
or needs.29
2 Unitary theories
Unitary theories30 conceptualise public interest as superseding interests that
transcend the interests of individuals. Public interest is ideal-regarding and
often associated with moral values and judgments which guide all in society
whether they are aware of it or not. Its theorists tend to consider as valid the
judgments that actions or interests are in the public interest as opposed to
conflicting individual claims of interests which are consequently invalid.31
They apply an objective conception of interests to define public interest,
24 Held, above n 13, chs 3–5; also of interest is the classification of public interest theories by
Glendon Schubert, The Public Interest: A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept (Free
Press, 1960).
25 Aileen McHarg, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems
and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’
(1999) 62 Modern Law Review 671, 675; Held, above n 13, ch 3.
26 Held, above n 13, 50.
27 John Petrov Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Basil Blackwell, 1958) 14.
28 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); I M D Little, A
Critique of Welfare Economics (Oxford University Press, 1950) 54–6; Kenneth Arrow,
Social Choice and Individual Values (Yale University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 10–11.
29 Gerhart Niemeyer, ‘Public Interest and Private Utility’ in Carl J Friedrich (ed), Nomos V:
The Public Interest (Atherton Press, 1962) 8.
30 McHarg, above n 25, 675–6; Held, above n 13, ch 5.
31 Held, above n 13, 135.
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deriving these interests from what individuals ought to want, prefer and that
which is good for them based on a universal concept of what is morally
worthy. Such public interest conceptions seem to require individuals to
sacrifice self-interest,32 and act in the interest of the community and/or state.33
Accordingly, emphasis is placed on unity and the perceived collective and
uniform welfare of the community.34
3 Common interest theories
Here, public interest is defined with a focus on interests that are common to
all. These are non-conflicting interests.35 These interests are thus different
from interests of specific sections of society. Emphasis is placed on the
common good and allowing individuals within a given society to seek that
which is collectively good.36 The conception of common good and will here
is different to the interests or will of all because they are not only the sum of
a total of conflicting interests or even an aggregation of said interests; they
include interests born of unanimity.37 These definitions or conceptions of
public interest marry moral values and judgments with economics and/or
individualism because they attempt to incorporate the self-regarding aspects
of individual interests with others-regarding interests.38 Therefore, these
conceptions of public interest include values and interests such as wealth
maximisation, civil liberties, property rights, environmental protection, social
justice, and interest in information, knowledge and education all at once.39
A brief explication of corporate theories will now ensue as this sets the tone
for the deconstruction of public interest and corporate theories to reveal the
nuanced ways in which public interest is present in discourses relating to the
corporation and its role(s) within society.
III Corporate theories: Brief introduction and
classification of approaches
Corporate theories tend to fall broadly into three main strands or schools of
thoughts.40 The first strand is the law and economics strand which envelops
32 Plato, The Republic (Desmond Lee trans, Penguin Classics, 2007) 412, 520 [trans of:
Πολιτεία (first published 360 BCE)].
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid 462–5; John Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (Doubleday, 1970) 141; Ifeanyi
Menkiti, ‘Person and Community in African Traditional Thought’ in Richard A Wright (ed),
African Philosophy: An Introduction (University Press of America, 1984) 171, 176.
35 McHarg, above n 25, 676–8; Held, above n 13, ch 4.
36 Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Charles Frankel, The Social Contract (Hafner, 1947) Book II
ch III, 26, ch I, 23.
37 Ibid Book II ch III, 26; Book II ch VI, 33–4.
38 Harold Lasswell, ‘The Public Interest: Proposing Principles of Content and Procedure’ in
Carl J Friedrich (ed), Nomos V: The Public Interest (Atherton Press, 1962) ch 5, 57.
39 Domènec Melé, ‘Integrating Personalism into Virtue-Based Business Ethics: The Personalist
and the Common Good Principles’ (2009) 88 Journal of Business Ethics 227; Carol Lewis,
‘In Pursuit of the Public Interest’ (2006) 66 Public Administration Review 694, 698–9;
Wiredu, above n 1, 17; Kwame Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections
on the African Experience (Oxford University Press, 1997).
40 There is no agreed consensus on these three schools of thought, see Janet Dine, The
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legal and economic contractarianism.41 Its focus is on an individualist and
economic rationality approach to effective corporate governance.42
The second strand is the communitarianism or pluralist strand. It is
sometimes referred to as the ‘progressive approach’ because of the general
focus on shared values and interests of various stakeholders in the common
good, and unifying objective which is the good governance of companies or
the notion of corporations as institutions which are part of society and thus
subject to moral and social obligations.43
The third strand is the entity or corporate personality theory which
conceptualises the corporation as a separate entity in its own right for which
good corporate governance is indispensable for its continuous evolution,
reproduction and existence.44 Therefore paying attention to societal interests is
in the interest of the corporation for its viability but it is a citizen in its own
right and subject to obligations of good citizenship.45
There are some preliminary conclusions which can be inferred from the
above exploration of corporate theories. One can deduce that the various
theories have political conceptions and foundations that underpin them which
implicitly or explicitly incorporate some notion of the public interest.46 For
instance, contractarians appear to fall largely under the umbrella of
(neo)liberalism (as it pertains to economics) and individualism characterised
by a desire for a free market economy, freedom to contract and economic
efficiency, ultimately considered in the interest of society.47 Communitarians
appear to embrace a more socialist ideology, characterised by promotion of
social welfare and the community.48 The same may be said for concession
theorists who historically conceptualised the corporation as a concession
Governance of Corporate Groups (Cambridge University Press, 2000); Andrew Keay, The
Corporate Objective: Corporations, Globalisation and the Law (Edward Elgar Publishing,
2011).
41 Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization’ (1972) 62 American Economic Review 777; Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel
R Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1416, 1426–7;
Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of
Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship’ (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review 856, 869.
42 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press, 1962); Roy
Morrison, We Build the Road as We Travel (New Society Publishers, 1991) 107.
43 Amitai Etzioni, ‘Communitarianism’ in Karen Christensen and David Levinson (eds),
Encyclopedia of Community: From the Village to the Virtual World (Sage Publications,
2003) vol 1, A–D, 224; Rory Ridley-Duff, Communitarian perspectives on corporate
governance (Doctoral Thesis, Sheffield Hallam University, 2005) 17–27, 38.
44 E Merrick Dodd Jr, ‘For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law
Review 1145, 1145–63; David Millon, ‘Theories of the Corporation’ (1990) 39 Duke Law
Journal 201, 211–20; Sarah Worthington, ‘Shares and shareholders: property, power and
entitlement: Part II’ (2001) 22 Company Lawyer 307, 310.
45 George F Canfield, ‘The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory’ (1917) 17
Columbia Law Review 128, 128–43; Millon, above n 44, 216.
46 J Pound, ‘The rise of the political model of corporate governance and corporate control’
(1993) 68 New York University Law Review 1003, 1003–9.
47 Gerry Rubin and David Sugarman (eds), Law, Economy and Society, 1705–1914: essays in
the history of English Law (Professional Books, Abingdon, 1984) 12–13; Ross Grantham,
‘The Doctrinal Basis of The Rights of Company Shareholders’ (1998) 57 Cambridge Law
Journal 554, 578–82; Dine, above n 40, 14; John E Parkinson, Gavin Kelly and Andrew
Gamble (eds), The Political Economy of the Company (Hart Publishing, 2001) 4, 23–5.
48 Parkinson, Kelly and Gamble, above n 47, 35–6; Dine, above n 40, 17–18.
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granted by the state and therefore subject to a number of obligations in order
to retain its social licence to operate and privileges granted to it such as limited
liability.49 This is quite significant because it highlights, first, that the
corporation and corporate theories are not apolitical. Second, the exclusion or
inclusion of interests such as other forms of efficiency or rationality is itself
indicative of adherence to certain understanding of the societal role of
corporations and indeed conceptions of the public interest;50 this will be
explored in greater detail in subsequent sections of this article.
III.I Corporate theories and perspectives and public
interest
1 Economic corporate theories and public interest
Economic and contractarian perspectives on the firm and corporate
governance as aforementioned tend to advocate an economic conception of
corporations. This is often based on the notion that the corporation serves the
purpose of reducing transaction costs of contracting, increasing efficiency in
production and the better allocation of resources.51 There are nonetheless
identifiable public interest rationales behind these theories.
Economists and advocates of an economic analysis of the law generally
conceptualise public interest as ‘the commons’,52 demonstrating a distinction
between private and public goods. The commons are seen as public goods
which afford benefits to a large number of people, paid through taxation and
other relevant societal endeavours required or imposed by the government and
for which the government acts as trustee for the benefit of society.53
Correspondingly, public interest is often thought to be a utilitarian concept, a
product of a liberal democratic system, and born of ongoing organic political
activity informed by individual interests and interest groups. Essentially it
evolves with societal mores and political climate. Consequently, it is argued
that public interest is a concept devoid of morality or ethics and instead simply
a fruit of utilitarian or pragmatic (political) calculations in society.54 Public
interest is then considered to be a notion that ought to be largely restricted to
the public sphere; the commons or public goods in a manner that serves a
preponderance of individuals or is of utility to the greatest number of
49 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 29 June 1855, vol 139,
cc310, 356–7; Grantham, above n 47, 578–82.
50 Ridley-Duff, above n 43, 17.
51 Ronald H Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386; Oliver E Williamson,
‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ (1979) 22 Journal
of Law and Economics 233.
52 Christopher Hood, Administrative Analysis: An Introduction to Rules, Enforcement, and
Organizations (Wheatsheaf Books, 1986) 2–12.
53 King, Chilton and Roberts, above n 9, 958.
54 Ibid 960; Michael Harmon, ‘Administrative Policy Formulation and the Public Interest’
(1969) 29 Public Administration Review 483, 484–5; Bradley S Chilton and James A Woods,
‘Moral Justifications on the Rehnquist Court: Hercules, Herbert, and “Druggies” Under the
Fourth Amendment’ (2006) 17 Criminal Justice Policy Review 343, 343–51.
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individuals.55 Therefore the focus is on individual interests and preferences
rather than collectivism per se. Thus, economic perspectives on corporate
governance and public interest are arguably more affiliated with
preponderance theories of public interest. These economic theories gravitate
towards favour economic rationality and liberal individualism, with a focus on
self-actualisation, economic liberty as well as wealth maximisation.56 They
thus adhere to the school of thought that advocates minimal state intervention
in corporations and their governance, highlighting instead the liberty (to
contract and enterprise) without unwarranted governmental or other state
interference.57 They advance and extol notions of individual freedom without
state coercion even in the face of economic inequalities58 coupled nonetheless
with the protection of clearly defined property rights.59 This might give the
impression that economic individualism is the antithesis of public interest but
in reality, to paraphrase Bozeman, it is the forest in which many a great public
policy trees grow.60 So individualism and public interest run together in many
contexts, one of which is corporate law and governance.
In fact, some theorists contend that firms exist to meet societal need of
reducing transaction costs in production and contributing to the reduction of
social costs.61 They add that the corporation has led to the better coordination
of mass production, in a manner that is seemingly more efficient than markets
and bureaucracies and with lower production costs.62 They argue that this has
contributed to economic efficiency and is instrumental in the improvement of
societal social welfare.63 In this manner, corporations serve societal interests,
and may be considered to act in the public interest.
55 Mary Warnock (ed), Utilitarianism and on Liberty: Including ’Essay on Bentham’ and
Selections From the Writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008)
188–90.
56 Richard Thaler, ‘From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens’ (2000) 14 Journal of Economic
Perspectives 133.
57 F A Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition (University of Chicago Press,
2011) 22–38; F A Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (University of Chicago Press, 2007) 72–87,
103–7.
58 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition, above n 57, 146, 87–8.
59 Ibid 118; Friedman, above n 42, 34, 37–8.
60 Bozeman, above n 1, 40.
61 Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, above n 51; Ronald H Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’
(1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1.
62 William W Bratton Jr, ‘The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from
History’ (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 1471, 1475, 1488–9.
63 Martin Gelter, ‘The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Toward a Holdup Theory of
Stakeholders in Comparative Corporate Governance’ (Discussion Paper No 17, John M Olin
Center For Law, Economics, and Business Fellows, Harvard Law School, 2008) 9; Journal
of the House of Commons (1803) vol 29, 785; William McColloch, ‘A Shackled Revolution?
The Bubble Act and Financial Regulation in 18th Century England’ (Working Paper
No 2013–06, University of Utah, Department of Economics, March 2013) 11–12; Bishop
Carleton Hunt, The Development of the Business Corporation in England, 1800-1867
(Harvard University Press, 1936) 10–11; See Parliamentary Debates about the repeal of the
Bubble Act in 1825 and in 1855 the Marine Insurance Bill: United Kingdom, Parliamentary
Debates, House of Commons, 28 May 1824, vol 11, cc 920–33; Partnership Amendment Bill
and the Limited Liability Bill: United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of
Commons, 29 June 1855, vol 139, cc 310–58; Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Methuen, 1904) Book V.I.94, 96–100; Darcy v Allein
(1602) Noy 173, 182.
Deconstructing and identifying public interest 9
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 10 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Thu Nov 29 18:12:28 2018
/journals/journal/ajcl/vol33/10-330304
Under economic theories, corporate law is considered largely as a way of
providing templates and structures for contracting parties and transaction
costs.64 It sets out significant aspects of the corporation, particularly, corporate
governance; the role of directors and their duties to the corporation.65 This
facilitates the organisation of corporations and thus reduces the transaction
costs which would perhaps be otherwise incurred if these corporation statutes
did not exist. It is claimed that this is ultimately beneficial for society as it
serves the public interest of mitigating obstacles to production and
transactions.66 Hence, public interest in economic analysis of corporate law
and corporate governance is also interpreted as efficiency and facilitation of
the organisation of production and transactions.
Under this notion of public interest in corporate governance, the interests of
other factors of production such as consumers, employees and suppliers are
considered important but largely out of the scope of corporate law and
corporate governance, that is, they ought to be regulated or addressed under
consumer (protection) law, employment law, contract law, etc and not under
corporate law.67 This is believed to be the most effective way to ensure the
proper protection of other constituencies or factors of production within the
corporation as shareholders generally will hold directors accountable and
ensure that they act in the best interests of the corporation which contributes
to the protection of non-shareholder constituencies’ interests and ultimately
social welfare through ‘the pursuit of aggregate social welfare’.68 Economic
analysis of corporate law and governance also implicitly incorporates the
public interest through the protection of property rights of shareholders. This
is because such protection can be said to be indirectly in the interest of society
as it maintains the fundamental principles of liberty and entrenches the
protection of the pursuit of individual goals as well as reinforces protection
from governmental intervention in private contracts and private orderings.69
Many advocates of economic conceptions of the nature of the corporation
extrapolate that in order for the corporation to remain an efficient and effective
institution which continues to contribute to the maximisation of general
welfare, it should focus on shareholder primacy and profit maximisation as the
aggregation of shareholders (self-interested individuals), coming together to
find and exploit opportunities for mutually beneficial exchanges, best serves
64 William W Bratton Jr, ‘Nexus of Contracts Corporation: A Critical Appraisal’ (1989) 74
Cornell Law Review 407, 407–8.
65 Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, above n 4.
66 Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock and Stuart Turnbull, ‘An Economic Analysis of Limited
Liability in Corporation Law’ (1980) 30 University of Toronto Law Journal 117, 136;
Ian B Lee, ‘The Role of the Public Interest in Corporate Law’ in Claire Hill and Brett
McDonnell (eds), Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law (Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2012) 8.
67 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89
Georgetown Law Journal 439, 441, 449.
68 Ibid.
69 King, Chilton and Roberts, above n 9, 957; Richard Posner, The Economics of Justice
(Harvard University Press, 2nd ed, 1983) 88–119; Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty: The
Definitive Edition, above n 57, 22–38.
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the objective of improving general welfare.70 Furthermore, it is thought that
giving control rights to shareholders and affording them more primacy means
better scrutiny of the governance of these corporations because they are the
residual owners and most invested in their good governance71 and it reduces
debilitating decision-making conflicts between stakeholders.72 Although
advocates of this approach do not explicitly argue that this benefits public
interest, it is argued that shareholder primacy is a better way of resource
allocation in the interest of all in society and the maximisation of aggregate
social wealth.73
It is of course not surprising that advocates of economic analysis of
corporate law usually reject any unnecessary state interference; that is, state
intervention that exceeds some regulation of competition to ensure fairness,74
and regulations which exceed the facilitation of contractual relationships
between actors of the corporations because state interference could lead to
inefficiencies and augmentation of transaction costs.75 Furthermore, it is
contended that state intervention could in fact be detrimental to the
development of societal interests, particularly economic or property interests
because it does not necessarily reduce transaction and other social costs,
particularly in the context of corporations.76 It is similarly believed that
making use of the efficient markets approach is generally more effective than
bureaucracies born of state intervention due to the difficulty of monitoring
directors externally and the corresponding costs of doing so.77 States may also
expropriate and conscript properties as well as violate civil liberties.78
In light of the above, corporations are not only of public value; so is
shareholder primacy, that is, in the interests of a large preponderance of
individuals and thus in the public interest.79 Therefore contrary to popular and
anecdotal belief, economic theories are not devoid of notions of the public
interest but instead claim that shareholder (wealth) maximisation or primacy
brings the corporation closer to acting in society’s interest, that is, the public
interest.
70 Thomas Miceli and Matthew Baker (eds), Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) Introduction; Grantham, above n 47, 554.
71 Paddy Ireland, ‘Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’ (1999) 62 Modern
Law Review 32.
72 Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales, ‘Power in a Theory of the Firm’ (1998) 113 Quarterly
Journal of Economics 387, 425.
73 Hansmann and Kraakman, above n 67, 439–41; John Armour, Simon Deakin and Suzanne
Konzelmann, ‘Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance’ (2003)
41 British Journal of Industrial Relations 531.
74 Guido Calabresi, ‘Some Thoughts on Risk Distributions and the Law of Torts’ (1961) 70
Yale Law Journal 499.
75 Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, ‘Corporate Control Transactions’ (1981) 91 Yale
Law Journal 698, 700; Eric Orts, ‘Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm’
(1998) 16 Yale Law and Policy Review 265, 275.
76 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above n 61, 15–17.
77 Thomas Clarke, ‘Introduction: Theories of Governance – Reconceptualizing Corporate
Governance Theory after the Enron Experience’ in Thomas Clarke (ed), Theories of
Corporate Governance: The philosophical foundations of corporate governance (Routledge,
2004) 5.
78 Ibid.
79 Bozeman, above n 1, 23, 53–4; Alchian and Demsetz, above n 41, 777–95; Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Macmillan, 1932).
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A deconstruction of economic corporate theories and the various issues
discussed above reveal that contrary to popular belief, public interest is not the
antithesis to economic theories of the firm and corporate governance, rather
they embrace it in a manner that is altogether more subtle and implicit but
nonetheless very present. This is significant because drawing out the public
interest implicit in economic theories enables more nuanced understanding of
(many) corporations as they currently exist today, and the emphasis is placed
on shareholder primacy and efficiency.
However, deconstruction also exposes the flaws in economic corporate
theories and corresponding perceptions of public interest. While some
elements of the economic theories are beneficial to conceptualising public
interest, an unwavering dependence on contractarianism or economic
satisfaction, for example, is problematic because it is submitted that they do
not provide an accurate representation of reality. The reliance on a potent mix
of economic individualism, utilitarianism and liberalism alone, to equate
serving the public interest, excludes a number of other interests or values that
also serve society. For instance, economic perspectives are commonly
premised on the desire to protect certain rights, especially individuals’
property rights, freedom of association and liberty to entreprendre which are
legitimate considerations, however to equate them solely with public interest
could mean a superficial and incomplete grasp of interests which are beneficial
to society such as equality and protection of the vulnerable.
Although economic perspectives are very important to understanding and
addressing directorial misconduct in the light of public interest, they are
insufficient to adequately address it because they do not guarantee good
governance in the best interests of the corporation or in the interests of other
constituents who may not be protected under other areas of law, whereas a
more robust understanding of public interest might intervene by more readily
requiring state intervention to protect the rights of these constituents.80 A close
examination of these economic theories as they are currently conceptualised
seems to indicate that they are not cognisant of the evolving global economy,
and the shifting role and nature of corporations. The shift from being a means
of efficient facilitation of mass production and organisation into powerful
alternative institutions with growing global power, influence in governance
(even in the public sphere) as well as the interdependence of public and
private spheres is not sufficiently addressed.81 This means that these theories
have a blind spot as they seem tethered to a reductionist and, arguably,
outdated understanding of corporations and public interest. An illustration of
this is the notion of efficiency which is fundamental to these theories and
which is based on an objective ‘ethnocentric oneirism’ definition.82
Ethnocentric oneirism refers to an ethnocentric misconception of writing as
writing according to a western structure of signs and phonetic notation,83 an
act which is indicative of a society’s transformation from primitive to
80 Cheryl Wade, ‘Fiduciary Duty and the Public Interest’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law
Review 1191.
81 Joseph T Mahoney, Anita M McGahan and Christos N Pitelis, ‘The Interdependence of
Private and Public Interests’ (2009) 20 Organization Science 1034, 1035.
82 Derrida, Of Grammatology, above n 11, 49, 109–10.
83 Arturo J Aldama, ‘Tayo’s Journey Home: Crossblood Agency, Resistance and
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civilised.84 Conceptualising writing in an ethnocentric and narrow manner
reduces it to writing in a certain arbitrary manner or the use of accepted
techniques when in reality those who are argued to be without writing are
simply not performing the act of writing according to a certain standard. Here
this is extended to signify and connote a (western) ethnocentric singular
approach to conceptualising efficiency. The accepted definition of efficiency is
arguably homogenous even in its application in law and economics. A
deconstruction of this notion may lead to further exploration of its meaning,
its critique and redefinition which would not necessitate a hierarchy or order
of subordination of interests. Therefore, the question ‘efficiency according to
whom?’ does not seem redundant even in the context of corporate law because
of the heterogeneity of efficiency rationales and underlying individual and
societal preferences.85 The same critique could be applied to economic
perspectives on the public interest due to the ethnocentric and singular
approach taken to conceptualise the public interest. Societal interest goes
beyond a reductionist view of efficiency, reduction in transaction costs and
increase in aggregate social welfare, even in the context of corporations.
Separating social interests from economic considerations such as
environmental protection or reducing inequalities or equities means that one
is left with narrow conceptions of the public interest. This is challenging
because corporations can be complicit in environmental degradation and
contribute to economic disparities.86 The ethocentric oneirist approach to
public interest robs public interest of the opportunity to reflect societal
preferences and address societal needs.
It is nonetheless noteworthy that public interest is a crucial concept which
is a subject of enquiry, albeit largely implicitly in law and economic theories
and thought and enables a more complex understanding of the role of
corporations in society. Allusions are made to public interest in discussions
about the firm, the nature of the corporation and identifying values which
contribute to optimal and efficient resources allocation, reduction of
production and transaction costs, societal wealth maximisation and the
improvement of the economy. These are all thought to be indispensably
beneficial for society and its general welfare.
Attention will be turned to pluralist and concession theories of the firm to
examine if they provide more robust understanding of the public interest.
Transformation: A Reading of Leslie Marmon Silko’s Ceremony’ in John C Hawley (ed),
Cross-Addressing: Resistance Literature and Cultural Borders (SUNY Press, 1996) 157,
160.
84 Derrida, Of Grammatology, above n 11, 109–10; Peter Trifonas, ‘Teaching the Other II:
Ethics, writing, community’ in Gert J Biesta and Denise Egéa-Kuehne (eds), Derrida &
Education (Routledge, 2001) 109–10.
85 Chris William Sanchirico, ’Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale’ (2001) 86 Cornell
Law Review 1003, 1056–70; Jill Fisch, ’Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role
of Shareholder Primacy’ (2006) 31 Journal of Corporation Law 637, 639.
86 United Nations, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework (2011)
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.
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2 Pluralist corporate theories and perspectives and public interest
Pluralist and concession theories are generally associated with the public
interest because it has often played a significant part in the development of the
theories. Concession theory, for example as aforementioned, historically
considered the corporation to be a concession granted by the state87 and so in
order for a corporation to retain legitimacy and the social licence to exist, it
must act in a manner that is in the interest of society to a certain degree.
Incorporating concepts such as representation of various constituencies,
legitimacy and accountability in the governance of the corporation are
portrayed as public interest considerations which are indispensable to good
corporate governance.88 Concession theory can be said to embrace a unitary
conception of public interest as a superseding interest transcending and
reconciling the interests of individuals and other sections of society including
corporations, guiding them on ideals of common good to which they ought to
strive. Concession theorists tend to strongly advocate and emphasise the
validity of governmental regulation and implication in corporate governance
to ensure that these ideals of morality and common good are upheld.89
However, concession theory fell out of fashion and favour with theorists in
corporate law and corporate governance due to arguments that individuals
would come together to devise ways of facilitating production regardless of
sovereign or state interference.90 Nevertheless, concession theory, though
largely of historical interest, is also of some utility because it enables an
understanding of the historical role corporations have played in society even
in contemporary times with an increasing emphasis placed on the private
character and nature of corporations.91 Concession theory also arguably
served as a source of inspiration for advocates of other corporate theories such
as an anti-managerialist (pluralist) approach to corporate governance which is
concerned primarily with limiting the power and discretion afforded to
managers and directors of corporations because like decision-makers in the
public sphere,92 the actions of these corporate decision-makers can have
significant impact on society that far exceeds their sphere of governance and
so therefore, they ought to be subject to clearly defined legal controls.93
87 Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1612) 10 Co Rep 23a; Samuel Williston, ‘History of the Law of
Business Corporations Before 1800’ (1888) 2 Harvard Law Review 105, 116; City of London
v Vanacker (1699) 1 Lord Raymond 496, 498; R v Spencer (1766, K B) 3 Burr I827, 1839;
I Cleeve, The Law of Corporations Containing the Laws and Customs of All the
Corporations and Inferior Courts of Record in England (Printed by the assigns of R and
E Atkins, 1702) 17; Colin Cooke, Corporations, Trust And Company: An Essay in Legal
History (Manchester University Press, 1950) 58–60.
88 Bratton, ‘The New Economic Theory of the Firm’, above n 62, 1497.
89 See generally, Richard Flathman, The Public Interest: An Essay Concerning the Normative
Discourse of Politics (Wiley, 1966) pt I.
90 The development of the unincorporated company in the United Kingdom is illustrative of
this despite the Bubble Act of 1825 which was considered to be dead letter, see Cooke, above
n 87, 74–6; Armand B DuBois, The English Business Company after the Bubble Act,
1720–1800 (Commonwealth Fund, 1938) 86.
91 Bratton, ‘The New Economic Theory of the Firm’, above n 62, 1475.
92 Charitable Corp v Sutton (1742) 2 Atk 404; Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61; United
Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 3 July 1844, vol 76, cc 273, 278–82.
93 Bratton, ‘The New Economic Theory of the Firm’, above n 62, 1497–8.
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Essentially, looking at this approach through the lens of public interest reveals
a number of issues. It indicates how concession theory has influenced other
corporate theories but also highlights the unitary public interest theory which
is implicit in some anti-managerialist approaches to the public interest. By
holding directors to a high standard of scrutiny in their conduct, setting ideals
such as fairness, participation in governance, deliberative decision-making as
interests which supersede the private interests of directors and even the
corporations themselves,94 and contending that directors ought to incorporate
the interests of all who contribute to the creation of general value for the
corporation in their decision-making, they attempt to ensure that corporate
governance has a robust and multifaceted appreciation of the role of
contemporary corporations.95
In other pluralist corporate theories, public interest is incorporated in more
explicit ways. For some theorists, public interest signifies better alignment of
a corporation’s interests with those of society.96 Such alignment is demanded
as it is argued that society often deals with the systemic and negative
externalities of corporations and their actions. It is consequently contended
that it is neither efficient nor a true reduction of transaction costs for society
if it shoulders the cost of the inefficiencies of the corporation and ultimately
bearing the cost of the mishaps of the corporation.97 This pluralist approach to
public interest does not necessarily decentre or negate shareholder primacy
but it does require managerial stewardship98 and that shareholder primacy be
tempered with a greater consideration of other constituents of the corporation
and society’s needs for the reduction of excessive corporate risk-taking which
will have an impact on systemic externalities.99 This tempering is demanded
by some scholars even in cases when the risk is likely to benefit shareholders
because the risk might not be in the long-term interest of the corporation or
take into consideration social purposes of corporations.100 This is due to the
belief that the negative externalities of corporations could be damaging to
local communities’ economy, increase unemployment and thus poverty and by
consequence, reduce social as well as economic welfare.101 In light of these
concerns, it is claimed that state intervention might be necessary to restrict the
freedom to contract in order to prevent and reduce the effect of the
94 Roger Blanpain et al (eds), Rethinking Corporate Governance: From Shareholder Value To
Stakeholder Value (Kluwer law International, 2011) 332–3.
95 Ibid 337.
96 Lee, above n 66, ch 7; Günther Teubner, ’Company Interest: The Public Interest of the
Enterprise “In Itself”’ in Ralf Rogowski and Ton Wilthagen (eds), Reflexive Labour Law:
Studies in Industrial Relations and Employment Regulation (Kluwer, 1994) 21; Branston,
Cowling and Sugden, above n 3.
97 Steven Schwarcz, ‘Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty’ (2016) 92 Notre
Dame Law Review 1, 29–30.
98 Elmer Johnson, ‘General Motors Corporation, Its Constituencies and the Public Interest’
(1986) 5 Journal of Business Ethics 173, 173–4.
99 Overend, Gurney and Co v Gurney (1868–69) LR 4 Ch App 701, 717–20
(Lord Hatherley LC); The Overend and Gurney Co v Gibb (1871–72) LR 5 HL 480, 495,
500, 502, 506.
100 David Lutz, ‘African Ubuntu Philosophy and Global Management’ (2009) 84
(Supplement 3) Journal of Business Ethics 313, 315.
101 Steven Schwarcz, ‘Systemic Risk’ (2008) 97 Georgetown Law Journal 193, 207; Wade,
above n 80.
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aforementioned externalities.102 Some academics have suggested that the
greater governmental intervention ought to incorporate a public governance
duty discouraging excessive directorial risk-taking and requiring directors to
engage in a balancing act of incorporating various constituents’ interests
including society’s interests in their governance decision-making.103 This
approach implicates a common interest approach to the public interest because
it maintains that the reduction of corporations’ systemic externalities and their
impact on society are of public interest, interests common to all due to the
harm caused to the public; the local and wider economy, rather than sections
of society.104 This assimilates common interest theories of public interest
which focus on non-conflicting interest in society as discussed in the earlier
parts of this article.
In similar fashion, other corporate theories, such as the team production105
and director primacy theories, also incorporate common interest theories of
the public interest.106 This is because these approaches appear to incorporate,
in varying degrees, the expectation that directors will act or ought to act in a
manner that takes into consideration the common good of all stakeholders of
the corporation,107 despite the fact that certain advocates place special focus
on shareholders.108 Although the emphasis is on managerial discretion, it is
argued by these theorists that there is an onus placed on directors to evaluate
and balance the different conflicting and legitimate interests of different
constituents of the corporation.109 This implicitly means exemplarily
102 Moore, above n 10, 236; Henry Butler and Jonathan R Macey, ‘Externalities and the
Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority’ (1996)
14 Yale Law and Policy Review 23, 29; Steven Schwarcz, ‘Rethinking Freedom of Contract:
A Bankruptcy Paradigm’ (1999) 77 Texas Law Review 515, 520–1, 534–6, 551 et seq.
103 Lee, above n 66, 15; Schwarcz, ‘Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty’,
above n 97, 48–52.
104 Alan Morrison, ‘Meta Contracting and Autonomy: A Liberal Theory of the Firm’
(May 2012) 1, 22–3; Butler and Macey, above n 102, 29.
105 Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (1999) 85
Virginia Law Review 248; Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, ‘Team Production in Business
Organizations: Introduction’ (1999) 24 Journal of Corporation Law 743; Allen Kaufman
and Ernie Englander, ‘A Team Production Model of Corporate Governance’ (2005) 19
Academy of Management Executive 9, 12; Alchian and Demsetz, above n 41, 777; Bengt
Holmstrom, ‘Moral Hazard in Teams’ (1982) 13 Bell Journal of Economics 324; Robin
Marris, The Economic Theory of ‘Managerial’ Capitalism (Palgrave MacMillan UK,
1964) 16.
106 Stephen Bainbridge, ‘The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts’ (2002) 88 Iowa Law
Review 1.
107 Alan J Meese, ‘The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment’
(2002) 43 William and Mary Law Review 1629, 1632; Blair and Stout, ‘A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law’, above n 105, 276–87; ibid 1.
108 Bainbridge, ‘The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts’, above n 106, 31–3.
109 Some director primacy advocates such as Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Preserving Director Primacy
by Managing Shareholder Interventions’ in Jennifer G Hill and Randall S Thomas (eds),
Research Handbook on Shareholder Power and Activism (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015)
231; and Bernard Sharfman, ‘Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Implementation
under Corporate Law’ (2015) 66 Florida Law Review 389, 394–401 would see the aim as
being shareholder wealth maximisation in a board primacy context. Also see Lynn Stout,
‘The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public
Corporations Tolerate Board Governance’ (2003) 152 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 667, 685–6; Martin Lipton and Steven Rosenblum, ‘Election Contests in the
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managerial conduct because in order for the various constituents of the
corporation to rely on the expertise and legitimacy of directors as objective
trustworthy decision-makers, they must portray that they are not easily
influenced or even susceptible to the temptation of other (personal) interests
which would interfere with the exercise of their official duty as agents of the
corporation.110
A deconstruction of pluralist and/or communitarian corporate theories
reveals that public interest is also present in these corporate law and
governance approaches. However, the various theories discussed above
incorporate theories of public interest in diverse ways. Some apply public
interest in a universalising and transcending manner to justify managerialism,
electing directors as best placed to serve all of a corporation’s constituents or
stakeholders including society at large, due to their expertise and insider
knowledge.111 Others advocate an anti-managerialist but stakeholder-centric
stance because they consider that managerial discretion ought to be tempered
as directors might be tempted to engage in excessive risk-taking for their own
interests.112 These theorists argue that this is vital in order to ensure maximal
good governance in society’s interests as well as other stakeholders. For
example, this limits societal exposure to corporations’ negative externalities.
The incorporation of public interest in these corporate theories reveals varying
conceptions of the role of corporations in society and attempts to justify how
the different approaches serve or can serve societal needs.
A deconstruction of the various conceptions of the public interest in the
pluralist corporate theories also draws out a number of issues which could be
impediments to a complex understanding of the role of corporations in our
increasingly globalised world. For instance, a deconstruction of the
anti-managerialist approach highlights an emphasis on the need to scrutinise
managerial discretion but may not address the complex inner layers of
directorial misconduct. For example, in cases where directors are also
shareholders, if the focus is simply on procedures, directors could be said to
have fulfilled their duty of loyalty appropriately and in the public interest even
in cases where they have reduced the duty to a simple box-ticking exercise.
Also, as is the case with shareholder-centric corporate theories and their
aggregative or preponderance conceptions of the public interest, the pluralist
corporate theories discussed above are not necessarily compatible with
important issues of societal interests such as environmental protection,
respecting the local communities in which a corporation operates. For
Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come’ (2003) 59 Business Lawyer 67, 79;
George Dent, ‘Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy
Models of Corporate Governance’ (Faculty Publications Paper No 164, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law, 2008)
<http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/164.
110 Although some director primacy advocates such as Bainbridge link this to agency theory and
nexus of contracts theory which have consequences for the conception of public interest,
aligning it more with preponderance theories: Stephen Bainbridge, The New Corporate
Governance in Theory and Practice (Oxford University Press, 2008); Bainbridge, ‘The
Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts’, above n 106, 1.
111 Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, ‘Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the
Corporate Board’ (2001) 79 Washington University Law Quarterly 403.
112 Berle and Means, above n 79.
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example, theorists who advocate for extensive managerial discretion do so in
order that directors may govern bona fide in the interest of the corporation.
This does not allow them to act in ways considered not in the interests of the
corporation; therefore acting in the best interests of a corporation does not
extend beyond communities where corporations actively operate.113 Similarly,
even if the definition of ‘actively operate’ is enlarged or generous, this is still
arguably less than the entire society.114 Granted that some scholars who make
a business case for corporate social responsibility advocate that this means
that directors ensure and assure the protection of the long-term interests of a
corporation by having regard to its stakeholders and the public interest,115 it
does not change the fact that the definition of public interest here is subject to
hierarchy of interests and order of subordination. The focal point still remains
a fairly narrow interpretation of the best interests of a corporation which does
not quite capture the evolving role of corporations in society and the part that
it plays in globally.
Certain scholars have tried to address the changing role of the corporations
and better align it with the public interest. They contend that due to the
increasing blurred lines and interdependence between the public and private
sphere, directors ought to manage corporations in the best interest of the
public and not simply the national public interest but perhaps in the interest of
the global community.116 The impact of the recent financial and economic
crisis has been used to illustrate the extent of (transnational) corporations’
power, reach and impact117 but also to highlight the far-reaching effects of bad
corporate governance and corporate irresponsibility on the global economy
and community.118 They suggest corporate governance with the public interest
objective of global sustainable value creation.119 Notwithstanding that these
scholars have argued that directors have the (practical) discretion to place
public interest above other interests in the governance of a corporation,120 this
is arguably only the case in theory and there is very little evidence to suggest
otherwise in practice.121 Likewise, it has been contended that this is because
this approach to corporate governance and public interest is impractical and
unworkable in reality, creating more opportunities for directors to abuse their
power and position under the guise of societal interests. It could create
regulatory fatigue which would not encourage compliance and may even
cause setbacks in the management of directorial misconduct. While the
113 Blair and Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’, above n 105, 248; Lee,
above n 66, 13.
114 Blair and Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’, above n 105, 248; Blair and
Stout, ‘Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board’, above
n 111.
115 Einer Elhauge, ‘Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest’ (2005) 80 New York
University Law Review 733.
116 Mahoney, McGahan and Pitelis, above n 81, 1040.
117 Allan Hutchinson, The Companies We Keep: Corporate Governance for a Democratic
Society (Irwin Law, 2005) 9; Dodd, above n 44, 1157; Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’,
above n 51, 388; Friedman, above n 42, 120.
118 Mahoney, McGahan and Pitelis, above n 81, 1038.
119 Ibid 1043–5; Lewis, above n 39, 698–9.
120 Mahoney, McGahan and Pitelis, above n 81, 1035, 1038.
121 Companies Act 2006 (UK) s 171; Lee, above n 66, 13.
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critique might be valid, the status quo, shareholder-centred corporate
governance or less explicitly public interest-centred approaches to corporate
governance do not necessarily reduce regulatory fatigue nor curtail managerial
indiscretion.122 Also deconstructing this approach to the public interest reveals
that it might be desirable because it does not shy away from the unworkable
or undecidable elements of public interest; it in fact seems to embrace it. This
could be useful because complexification or subtle nuances in the exploration
of a notion like public interest do not necessarily render it redundant but
instead could contribute to making the corporation a flexible and adaptable
institution which is self-aware and reflective in its societal role. After all,
justice, another complex notion, has not been abandoned simply because it
cannot be defined exhaustively.
In sum, public interest in communitarian or pluralist corporate theories is
more explicitly present in discourses. Its diverse conceptualisations attempt to
encompass values such as sustainable development, environmental protection,
protection of employee rights and wellbeing and corporate citizenship. These
are indicative of the fact that public interest is an important subject of enquiry
and that it enables better understanding of the societal role of corporations.
Deconstructing the various public interest notions in these corporate theories
indicates that these theories are also subject to a number of oversights. They
could in diverse ways hinder the attempt to create nuanced and refined
understanding of the evolving role of corporations and the compatibility of
corporations’ objectives with acting in the good of society and incorporating
values which are considered beneficial to public welfare. Therefore, although
these corporate theories seek to better explain how corporations serve or ought
to serve society and to a certain degree afford a more multifaceted grasp of the
role of corporations through their incorporation of the public interest, their
quest for objective and facile definition of the public interest hampers their
efforts. For example, by limiting public interest to national boundaries or
making societal interest subordinate to other interests such as shareholder or
employee interests, there is a recreation of a hierarchy of interests or lack of
appreciation of the importance of societal interests which may not thoroughly
reflect the significant role that corporations play in society especially in this
era of globalisation.
Attention will now turn to an exploration of corporate entity theories and
public interest so as to identify and deconstruct underlying public interest
rationales and their importance for explicating the societal role of
corporations. The various corporate theories discussed above tend to consider
the corporation to be a fictive artificial entity granted with legal personality,123
yet this has not negated their incorporation of the public interest, either tacitly
or explicitly. It will be considered if corporate entity theories which tend to
ascribe a separate and real personality to corporations automatically denote
that corporations serve the public interest. Essentially, it will be explored if
122 Michael Marin, ‘Disembedding Corporate Governance: The Crisis of Shareholder Primacy
in the UK and Canada’ (2013) 39 Queen’s Law Journal 223; Jonathan Ford, ‘Shareholder
primacy is central to modern governance woes’, Financial Times (online), 4 March 2018.
123 Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1896] UKHL 1; Trustees of Dartmouth College v
Woodward, 17 US (4 Wheat) 518, 636 (1819).
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these entity theories necessarily mean more complex or nuanced
understanding of the public interest role of corporations.
3 Corporate entity theories and perspectives and public interest
(a) Real entity theory and public interest
One of the key real entity corporate theories is inspired by Gierke’s real entity
theory.124 He opined that when individuals come together in groups to create
a collective entity, there is a trade between individual interests and collective
interests. Therefore, these individuals choose to make a sacrifice of their own
interests in order that the group acquires its own interests and goals which do
not fluctuate based on membership changes to the group. The group becomes
a real entity and legal recognition is not necessary to establish its existence. It
has its own will and property and individuals who govern it are simply its
organs carrying out its will.125
This theory tacitly incorporates notions of the public interest as Gierke
considered the corporation to have public and private character but his
conception of public and private spheres was a spectrum or continuum rather
than polar opposites.126 Therefore, he thought that private law dealt with the
external contractual interactions of the corporation while public law dealt with
the internal working and relationships within it as a social body, being that the
state is the all-encompassing social body. Correspondingly the governance of
corporations falls under the ambit of the state.127 Advocates of this approach
such as Laski and Deiser affirm that the state ought to be involved in the
management of corporations, that the law has everything to do with the inner
workings of the corporation, and even the character of those running it.128
This, they contend, is necessary because business affairs have ceased to be
merely a matter of private interests as they are bound to affect society. Hence
it is left to the state to protect society’s interests.129 It is in fact added that as
corporations go on to have increasing influence on our daily lives, regulating
our lives, they have to be made responsible for their actions, particularly when
they threaten the wellbeing of the community.130 This, if deconstructed, could
of course be taken to mean actions that are contrary to the (collective) public
interest ought to be regulated by the state. Furthermore, corporate realism
appears to embrace unitary or common interest conception of public interest
with regard to corporate governance. Gierke’s real entity theory considers that
124 Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age (Frederic William Maitland trans,
Cambridge University Press, 1900) xxi, xxvi; Alan Dignam and Michael Galanis, The
Globalization of Corporate Governance (Ashgate, 2009) 13.
125 Bratton, ‘The New Economic Theory of the Firm’, above n 62, 1490–3.
126 Gerald Rufus Isaacs, The South Sea Bubble (Greenwood Press, 1978) 64, 95.
127 Mark Hager, ‘Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational “Real Entity”
Theory’ (1989) 50 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 575, 630–1; Otto von Gierke, Die
Grundebegriffe des Staatstrechts und die neuesten Staatstrechtstheorien (Tübingen, 1874)
180–1, 183–4; Charitable Corporation v Sutton (1742) 26 ER 642, 405–6; A-G v Wilson
(1840) Cr & Ph 1.
128 Harold J Laski, ‘The Theory of Popular Sovereignty: I’ (1919) 17 Michigan Law Review
201, 213–14; George Deiser, ‘The Juristic Person – I’ (1908) 57 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 131, 139.
129 Harold J Laski, ‘The Basis of Vicarious Liability’ (1916) 26 Yale Law Journal 105, 111–12.
130 Deiser, above n 128, 141.
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corporations are real entities separate from the individuals who formed them,
which appears to implicitly indicate that there is a superseding and unifying
interest which transcends the interests of said individuals and that corporations
have a moral responsibility to act in the interest of society from which it
derives its legitimacy and to which it is accountable. Laski and Deiser‘s
corporate entity approaches, on the other hand, could be assimilated with
common interests conceptions of public interest because there is an implicit
acceptance that there are various and diverse interests which could be
important to the corporation and may differ from those of the state. Yet they
assert that the state ought to be involved in the inner workings of corporations
for the common interests of society as they claim that the far-reaching
(negative) impact of corporations’ actions ought to be regulated by the state.
While deconstructing these corporate theories reveals the public interest has
contributed to the understanding of the corporation, its public and private
character as well as the complexities of the role of corporations,
Deconstrcution also discloses an important issue; these corporate theories do
not define the ambit of the application of public interest in corporate
governance clearly. Although it appears that public interest seems largely to be
restricted to national boundaries due to the strong reliance on government
regulatory intervention, this could also arguably be extended to international
regulations (where they exist) on corporate governance. Nonetheless, one
thing remains unclear: is the concept of (corporate) citizenship limited to
national or international boundaries? This is another important question as
answers to it completely change the nature of corporate responsibility and
limits of the conception of the public interest. This could potentially mean that
corporations are global corporate citizens; directors could be held accountable
for acting contrary to obligation of citizenship and for not respecting their
responsibilities to act in the global public interest. Similarly, in that case, what
are the definitions of global or international public interest? This requires a
consideration of many possibilities and impossibilities of defining public
interest and more importantly, an awareness that paths selected to defining it
are chosen rather than exhaustively delimiting it. Such heterogeneity may be
promising as it means that public interest is defined in a dynamic manner
which could be more in harmony with fast evolving (global) societal needs.
Even so, it comes with new challenges and complexities.
(b) Autopoiesis and public interest
Another corporate entity theory which tacitly addresses the public interest is
autopoiesis. An autopoietic conception of corporate governance incorporates
the belief that corporations are self-referencing social sub-systems and that
law is not necessary to regulate society131 and law itself is a social system.132
Corporations are thus the organised domain of the economic system rather
than being part of the markets, the spontaneous domain of the economic
131 Andrew Johnston, EC Regulation of Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press,
2009) 221.
132 Niklas Luhmann, Law As a Social System (Oxford University Press, 2004) ch 3;
Ana Lourenço, ‘Autopoetic Social Systems Theory: The Coevolution of Law and the
Economy’ (Working Paper No 409, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge,
June 2010) 10.
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system.133 This separates them from the market; contract from organisation.134
Corporations are therefore thought to be operationally closed and fairly
autonomous in their environments which means that their shareholders as well
as other stakeholders are part of these environments.
The corporation maximises profits for itself as well as pursue other
corporate objectives that it ascribes to itself. The law therefore cannot directly
control the corporation as it is self-referencing and reproducing; all it can do
is put in place procedural regulation to encourage it to act in a manner that is
morally right.135 This leaves the process of the corporation’s organisational
autopoiesis untouched which is in the interest of society and for the betterment
of future generations as it guarantees the satisfaction of human needs for such
organisations.136 The aim of regulation is to ensure that corporations are more
responsive to their wider society as this is essential for the reflection and
reproduction of the social sub-systems that are corporations.137 The notion that
corporations’ sole goals are profit maximisation and shareholder primacy are
rejected under this theory as is any other partial notion of corporate goals
which favour sections of the corporate constituencies only.138 It is maintained
instead that focus ought to be the main social objective of the corporation and
its various contributions to different aspects of social life in order to determine
the corporate interest and public interest but not based on political
stakeholding theories based on notions such as power, legitimacy and
democracy.139 It is stated that the notion of individual human or natural
interests and the artificial interests of corporations are social constructs and
therefore the fixation on individualism is to be broken down so that attention
can be turned to corporations in order to ensure that they continue to remain
responsive and sensitive to their environment, assuring the preservation of
these entities’ social identity and self-reproductivity, power, autonomy and
resources.140
Deconstructing autopoietic corporate theory unveils a focus on unitary and
common interest conceptions of public interest as it considers that
corporations are social systems which serve the purpose of meeting human
needs for better production, communication and organisation for example, and
yet, corporations have a transcending interest in aligning their interests with
that of society so as to continue to remain responsive and attentive to their
environment.141 This means the focus is on a moralistic notion of common
good transcending the interests of certain sections of society, such as
133 Johnston, above n 131, 222; Günther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwell,
1993) 133.
134 Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System, above n 133, 133; Günther Teubner, ‘Enterprise
Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the “Essence” of the Legal Person’ (1988) 36
American Journal of Comparative Law 130, 137–8.
135 Johnston, above n 131, 222–4.
136 Teubner, ‘Enterprise Corporatism’, above n 134, 153.
137 Teubner, ‘Company Interest: The Public Interest of the Enterprise “In Itself”’, above n 96,
21, 33.
138 Ibid 31–2.
139 Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System, above n 133, 134–5.
140 Teubner, ‘Company Interest: The Public Interest of the Enterprise “In Itself”’, above n 96,
33–4.
141 Johnston, above n 131, 224–5.
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shareholders.142 Yet a closer examination of autopoiesis reveals that like some
of the pluralist theories already discussed, the focal point of discussion is the
best interests of the corporation and so any consideration of public interest is
aimed at contributing to the corporation’s ability to respond to its
environment, self-reproduce and self-reference. This means that ultimately
there will be conflicts between the interests of society and those of the
corporation. This consequently only allows for a limited role or consideration
of public interest in corporate governance. This approach is also not dissimilar
to economic perspectives on corporate law because a hierarchy of interests
and values are implicitly incorporated in autopoietic conception of the public
interest. It is arguably just as restrictive and limitative of the reach of public
interest even though it is articulated differently. Hitherto, autopoietic corporate
theory provides an important approach to explicating public interest in
corporate theories because the understanding of the role and indispensability
of corporations to society are clearly identified and highlighted.
Moreover, it can be deduced from the exploration of corporate entity
theories, autopoiesis and real entity theories that public interest has had an
important role to play in the definition and theorising on the firm and the
nature of the corporation. For instance, they contend generally that in order for
the corporation to be viable and continue to thrive, it ought to act more
responsibly within society. There is an acknowledgment that the longevity and
continuity of corporations are irrevocably tied to the society in which they
operate.
IV Conclusion
Applying a deconstructionist critique to the various corporate governance
theories and corresponding public interest theories affords an identification of
their merits and flaws and reveals a number of issues. Primarily, public interest
is an undecidable notion which is limited when an objective, singular
definition is sought. It is also evident that public interest is not necessarily a
notion that is irrevocably wedded to communitarianism or pluralist corporate
theories, as is sometimes thought. Exploring the different definitions of public
interest in corporate theories reveals that subtle nuances in the definitions
enrich the notion and make it more accommodating of various ideologies,
from communitarianism to contractarianism, which are often thought to be
polar opposites.
Similarly, deconstruction provides a basis for an understanding of the
political ideologies underpinning the various theories. It also reveals that
public interest bridges the gap between the various theories and could provide
a common ground on which dialogue can begin. Yet, a critique of the various
theories on public interest indicates that public interest itself is useful but not
infallible. Therefore, it is important when considering the notion of public
interest in corporate law and governance that such effort is not undertaken
uncritically.143 Likewise, a deconstruction method reveals the complexity and
vagueness of the concept — public interest does not necessarily equate to it
142 Ibid 225–7.
143 Teubner, ‘Company Interest: The Public Interest of the Enterprise “In Itself”’, above n 96,
32.
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being unworkable or not practical. Such an approach indicates that this is what
makes the concept more adaptable and flexible for the understanding of
corporations and corporate law. Public interest is thus a useful lens through
which to examine the development of corporations and it provides a focal
point or a common foundation for various theories of the firm and the nature
of the corporation on the most fundamental and basic question at the heart of
these theories — the role of corporations in society. It enables one to have a
complex and nuanced understanding of the role of corporations which is
important particularly in this era of globalisation and fast evolving societal
needs.
In sum, public interest is the lens through which corporations can be
analysed or examined. One might ask why public interest and not another
concept is able to serve this purpose. The answer is that public interest is such
an important concept in various other spheres and fields of enquiry or research
as mentioned earlier in this article. It is associated generally with good
governance and has connotations of values or actions which are beneficial to
society and its welfare.144 Public interest thus possesses strong moral force
which could make it the ideal concept to revitalise and rejuvenate discussions
about corporations and their role in society.
144 Michael Macaulay, ‘The I that is We: Recognition and Administrative Ethics’ in
Raymond W Cox, Ethics and Integrity in Public Administration: Concepts and Cases (M E
Sharpe, 2009) 36.
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